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From the end of the 1960s, when the model of development and the 
economie growth showed some alarming signs of exhaustion, the first reaction 
of managers was to reduce the costs of production through new forms of 
flexibility: flexibility of wages to allow immediate adjustments to the economy 
situation of the firm; flexibility of the work-force by opening new categories of 
part-time or temporary workers for a tighter allocation of human resources. 
These initiatives meant that the conventional or contractual rules had to be 
evaded or dissolved so that rules became the equivalent of rigidity and 
deregulation the equivalent of flexibility. In the advanced capitalist countries, 
the political, social and economy debate focused on the alternative between the 
status quo and neo-liberalism (Boyer, 1986; Lipietz, 1984; Rosanvallon, 1988; 
Bowles, Cordon, Weisskopf, 1983). In the early 90's, that dichotomy has been 
superseded by a variety of possibilities, as we will attempt to demonstrate. The 
object of this paper is first to give a general outline of the old model of firms, 
then to look at some experiences in the renewal of management styles and labor 
relations and, lastly, to suggest current different national trends in United States, 
Canada and Québec. 
THE DOMINANT MODEL. 
 
In order to sketch the different models, firms have to be understood 
according to two dimensions (Laville, 1990), an institutional  
dimension, which refers to the labor-management
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relations and the institutionalized compromise between the parties, and an 
organizational dimension, that of the division and organization of work 
within the firms. 
 
The first dimension, institutionalized compromise (or the structural form), 
defines the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the parties, in other words 
the rules of the game that determine the respective areas of influence, or the 
political System of the firm. In the dominant model of the post-war era, the 
compromise forged by dint of struggle resulted in trade unions recognizing the 
right of management to control the development and organization of the 
company, in return for management's recognition of the union as the bargaining 
agent for wages and collective labor rules. The latter includes the definition 
and classification of job positions as well as the rules of seniority relating to 
promotions, transfers and layoffs, and including grievance procedures for 
failure to respect the collective agreement. Therefore, from the outset, the right 
of negotiation was limited in its content, by excluding unions from the 
company's decision-making process, even in the areas of labor organization and 
technological change. This was, consequently, a form of compromise known as 
Fordism where, in exchange for management's maintaining its prerogatives, 
the union negotiates the sharing of capital gain according to the COLA (cost of 
living a d j u s t m e n t )  and AIF (annual improvement factor) formulas 
(Aglietta, 1976; Kochan, 1986; Boyer, 1986). By putting the emphasis on the 
labor rules, some authors would define this model as job control unionism 
(Katz, 1985). Whatever the case, the exclusion of workers from decisions led to 
diminished quality of products, productivity and so on (Linhart and Linhart, 
1985). 
 
In the case of the second dimension which relates to the division and 
coordination of work (the labor process) the dominant model was Consolidated 
in keeping with the principles of Taylorism. Taylorism involves the breakdown 
of tasks into individual operations and mechanization which accelerates the 
deskilling of workers through the use of machines with technical
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know-how, which in turn results in jobs that are reduced to a limited number of 
simple, closely-defined and repetitive tasks (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Conversely, 
conception and coordination are the sole prerogative of engineers and technicians 
who communicate with the workers by means of detailed procedures overseen by 
a hierarchy of supervisors (Bowles, Cordon, Weisskopf, 1986). 
 
The specified forms of both these dimensions came under attack 
simultaneously. The Taylorian division of labor was already being contested in 
the late 60's through a rise in strikes, absenteeism, turnover and low quality. The 
same happened to the Fordist compromise, with the growing refusal of the deal 
by which monotony and exclusion were compensated by wages increases. Ail 
this brought to the fore, without doubt, the social limitations of that model, but it 
pointed to its technical and economy limitations as well, since the increased costs 
of mechanization did not general an equal increase in productivity (Coriat, 1979) 
and thé rigidity of mass production prevented an adjustment to the diversification 
of markets and products (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Katz and Sabel, 1985). 
...AND THE ALTERNATIVES 
 
Faced with this crisis, what are the alternatives or the new trends for the 
coming years? On the organizational level, taylorism, known as scientific 
management, has been typified by an extreme division of labor and deskilling 
combined with control of workers by hierarchy and detailed procedures or 
directly by machines. Thus there are now two possibilities: either to maintain the 
deskilling trend via new technologies or to undertake a process of retraining and 
meet the demands of workers for initiative and creativity as  
well as consumers' demands for quality. This
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upgrading of qualification has to be matched with various forms of reorganization 
of labor, greater participation, technical, social and cultural training; in that 
context involvement and trust replace the detailed rules as a coordinating 
mechanism (Chanlat, 1989; Crozier, 1989). In the management literature which 
reduces the firm to that single dimension of work organization, this commitment 
is called the "corporate culture" as opposed to bureaucratie and centralized mode 
of coordination (Aktouf, 1990). 
 
It would be easy to present more differentiated types of work organization 
by coloring skilling-deskilling criteria with old or new forms of technologies, but 
there is no direct link between technology and qualification (Lapointe, 1991), so 
work organization is best defined by the qualification principle. 
 
As for the institutional System assigning rights and duties to management 
and labor, Fordism can be maintained with the restriction of collective bargaining 
to profit-sharing through wage rules and to job classifications, seniority and 
grievance procedures. But these collective rules considered as a source of rigidity 
can also be weakened through subcontracting or segmentation, or even be 
dissolved through individualized contracts. Finally, collective bargaining might 
contractualize some forms of participation or inclusion in the decision-making 
process, which means a broadening of the field of negotiation towards what had 
been management prerogatives like technological changes, training programs or 
investment policies. 
 
The combination of these organizational and institutional dimensions 
produces the different configurations (Table 1) of firms and, if one becomes 
generally accepted in a society, of national trends. 
 
Taking both the compromises (labor contract) and the organization of labor 
into account, the approach we propose holds several advantages. It enables us to  
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see clearly for example in what context the process of retraining occurs, that 
is with or withoutcollective rules. And also we extricate the debate from the 
dilemma of two and just two labor relations Systems, one, a conflicting or 
antagonistic model (adversary bargaining) and, the other, a cooperative or 
collaborative model (Katz, 1985). Indeed, the distinctions proposed enable us to 
see clearly how the participation of workers does not necessarily lead to 
"collaboration" or the relinquishment of their specified interests since according 
to the form of labor contract participation can take many forms, that of integrative 
participation (Californian model according to Messine, 1987) or that of adversary 
cooperation as in the case of conflict over the democratization of the firm. In 
doing so, a shift away from Fordism does not necessarily lead to concessions by 
the workers (Swartz, 1981); first, involvement and initiative become more and 
more important in the claims of workers, and second, because management 
requires that commitment, it can be "exchanged" for economy advantages or job 
security or some new rights and influence in the firm. 
 
A brief comment on each configuration might help to introduce the national 
trends. The fordist and taylorist ones are now well known: they combine a sharp 
division of labor with militant unions able to bargain wages increases, good work 
conditions and seniority rules to cope with layoffs. The renewed fordism adds job 
tenure to the compromise on wages and work rules so that reskilling and
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Table 1 Models of Firms according to organizational and institutional dimensions 
 
Labor contract Collective rules Dissolution or Collective rules 
 and exclusion 
 
weakening of 
collective rules 
with inclusion-
participation 
Labor process        
 (1) (2> (3) 
Deskilling Fordism Neo-Fordism Social démocratie
 and (Segmentation Taylorism 
 
 
Taylorism 
 
Polarization) 
 
 
 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Reskilling 
Organizational and 
technological 
changes 
 
Renewed Fordism 
(Job security and 
flexibility) 
 
Califomian 
(Individualization 
Wage and Job 
flexibility) 
 
Plant democracy 
 
 
 
involvement in quality and productivity may be effective without fear of job 
losses. The partial or total dissolution of collective rules may be used with the 
two different forms of work organization. The neo-fordist model deepens the 
deskilling trend either through new technologies and corresponding new 
classifications of technical operators, or via the deprivation of a part of the 
workers from the protection of the general rules. Examples include 
subcontracting, part-time work or two-tiers wages and work conditions. The 
californian model refers to an individualization of contractual relations and a 
reorganization of work along the lines of commitment, flexibility and teamwork;  
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the pay-for-knowledge wage scheme may be used to induce retraining. The neo-
fordist and californian configurations represent the neo-liberal trend as far as 
deregulation is concerned. Finally, the inclusion of workers in decision-making 
process associated with deskilling was labelled social-democracy taylorism by 
Boyer (1989), whereas the association of participation with flexibility and 
commitment would put the democratization of the firm on the agenda. 
 
 
NATIONAL TRENDS 
 
This typology might help to identify some national trends but it is not an 
easy task for two main reasons. First, the different models just presented are quite 
academy; they can be used as references but the monographs show that a single 
firm is more complex and above ail that the implementation of changes is not a 
transcript of a model but the result of trials and errors; it is often a mix of two 
configurations. Second, with the breakdown of the dominant model and the 
search for new management practices and labor relations, it may well appear that 
firms in one country and even plants of the same corporation follow different 
paths (Messine, 1987; Lapointe, 1991). Nevertheless, the observations available 
allow us to suggest some broad hypotheses about the main trends developing out 
of Fordism. For Canada and the United States, we rely on published material and 
for Québec, mainly on our own research. 
 
However, the main problem is elsewhere and can be put this way: is it 
possible to identify various national strategies within North America? are not the 
major manufacturing corporations and large unions in the three countries 
international, that is to say American? Are the governmental economy policies so 
different as to induce contrasting labor-management relations? Indeed, most 
American (Kochan, 1986) and European (Boyer, 1990) authors, while
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noting some particularities, look at the institutional forms of the firms in North 
America as one pattern to be compared! to others like Germany or Japan. Our 
contention here is that the differences are significant enough to pinpoint specified 
national trends. We will come back to this point later, but the recent history of the 
UAW (United Auto Workers) will provide a good illustration of our argument. 
 
 
The bargaining regime in North America is apparently largely decentralized 
considering the bargaining right is recognized at plant level. Nevertheless a 
dominant pattern of collective agreement was generalized soon after the Second 
World War through a two-way process. First, in each large economy sector, the 
international (American) union selected a target-enterprise to bargain wages and 
general work conditions; the agreement was extended to ail plants of the sector 
(pattern or connective bargaining) with minor adjustments at the plant level 
(Aglietta, 1976; Kochan, Katz, McKersie, 1986). Secondly, the best agreement 
gained in one sector, and in this regard the UAW was a leader, spread to the 
others (Benedict, 1985; Campbell et Pépin, 1988) so that a dominant pattern of 
labor-management relations was gradually laid down. 
 
 
In the seventies, more and more implicit then explicit local agreements 
paved the way to the fragmentation of the bargaining regime. In the car industry, 
the international pattern holds up to 1979, but when the UAW made a series of 
concessions to Chrysler, the Canadian locals undertook a strong anti-concessions 
drive and made clear their own objectives, which resulted in the transformation in 
1984 of the Canadian branch into an independent national union, the Canadian 
Auto Workers. That event points out the impossibility from now on of uniformly 
regulating labor-management relations in ail of North America and thus the 
emergence of different strategies. Looking at Canada and Québec, one observes 
here too the differentiation of regulatory mechanisms. Right  
after the Canadian union signed a national
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agreement in 1984, the Québec local entered into a long negotiation with GM-
Boisbriand and the local agreement arrived at in 1986 is at variance with the 
national one on many important issues, as we will show in the comparison below. 
However the Québec local is still affiliated to the national union. 
 
THE UNITED STATES 
 
A general survey of work organization and labor-management relations in 
U.S. firms would probably conclude that a large majority of them, at least in the 
unionized sectors, still stick to the classical fordist-taylorist model. But if we look 
at new experiments in these areas, it appears that with the exception of some 
cases of renewed fordism the main trends can be identified as neo-fordist and 
californian types. 
 
Renewed fordism as a main exception will be considered first because it is 
closely related to the tensions within the dominant model. Immediately after the 
"blue collar blues" and the strike at Lordstown (Rotschild, 1973), along with the 
debates about motivation at work and job enrichment (SHEW, 1973), some 
large firms including GM and Ford implemented new programs of Quality of 
Working Life (Chaskiel, 1990; Katz, 1985) like improvement of environment 
and job enlargement. But the unions were strongly opposed to any changes in 
the collective contract. The first compromise on these matters in the car industry 
appeared in the GM-UAW agreements of 1982 and 1984 when a job security 
program including retraining was concluded, as well as provisions for most 
flexible work rules. With this program no one could be laid off due to 
contracting out, technological change or increased productivity, or if so, they 
would be trained for new jobs. This agreement meant that job security was 
offered to reduce résistance among the workers to  
the technological modernization plans
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(Coriat, 1985; Katz, 1985b), but, most importantly, it aimed also at reducing the 
collective résistance to commitment to productivity increases and participation in 
organizational innovations (Campbell et Pépin, 1988). Some flexibility in work 
rules weakened opposition to initiatives like semi-autonomous teamwork or 
quality circles. In that way, it is a reversal of the deskilling process but within 
the limits of a fordist collective contract. There is no redefinition of the 
union's role and the innovations concern only the work organization; it is a 
renewed or rejuvenated (Boyer, 1990) fordism. 
This model did not spread in the American firms mainly because of the 
opposition of both unions and management. For the unions, the reorganization 
of the work process was not seen as an initiative to establish a new compromise 
but only as a series of concessions (Parker and Slaughter, 1989) that are ultimately 
threatening to unions: interior competition between plants, subcontracting, and 
displacement towards non-unionized areas. Also the diversity of local 
arrangements was considered as a threat to then unity of national unions (Katz and 
Sabel, 1985) and to the traditional role of the delegates in the plants. 
The management was losing some prerogatives like the restrictions on 
employment flexibility or layoffs. Above ail, management never fully accepted 
the presence of unions and always tried to limit their rights; they were considered 
as having been imposed by the New Deal administration (Noël, 1990). With the 
steady decline of union membership from 31% in 1970 to 15% in 1989 (Coates, 
1989), labor-management relations became less and less innovative, more and 
more adversorial, and the opposition to unions was intensified (Kochan, Katz, 
McKersie, 1986). Thus management had two alternatives: the californian and neo-
fordist strategies. 
 
The c a l i f o r n i a n  strategy is quite adequate to the management ideology and 
practice favouring the free market to make the necessary adjustments. Its objective 
was to introduce the non-unionized model based on the reorganization of labor 
and  human resource management (Katz, 1985; Heckscher, 1988). This model 
had always been présent in thé United States in major corporations
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such as IBM; it was considered as a way to avoid unionization by granting wages 
and employee benefits comparable to those negotiated in the large unionized 
companies, while skirting the "rigid" labor rules and the "cumbersome" 
grievance procedures. The success of companies having adopted the non-
unionized model combined with union opposition to any major amendment to the 
collective agreement prompted the automobile industry and others to locate their 
new plants in the Southern areas where state laws are unfavourable to unions. 
This southern strategy has two advantages: with the declining influence of the 
unionized sector on the non-unionized one, the pressure on high wages is now 
weakened; and without collective rules of the fordist type, management can 
introduce new forms of work organization. For example, GM relied at least 
partly on this strategy at the beginning of the 80s. The teamwork organization 
was at first implemented in ten non-unionized plants located in southern areas 
(Katz, 1985). 
The work teams required that labor rules be radically changed, or 
absent ail together, since the roughly 50 or 60 conventional jobs 
classifications were reduced to only one. Jobs were redefined to allow a team 
of 8 to 10 workers to carry out the production tasks as well as those of 
inspection, handling and maintenance. The work teams were responsible for 
the distribution of tasks as well as problem-solving; a policy of wages 
according to skills (pay for knowledge) was introduced to facilitate flexibility 
and acquisition of skills. Since the collective agreement was modelled on 
taylorism (Piore, 1982), the southern strategy sought to solve both "problems" at 
the same time which resulted in a californian model of plants. Later the team 
System was "exported" to unionized areas and in some cases the local unions 
accepted to revise the collective agreement to support work team initiatives, 
but this situation is indicative of either renewed fordism or plant democracy 
and no longer of the californian model. 
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The neo-Fordism seems to have been, with the californian one, the 
other most widespread model in United States. The neo-fordism deepens 
fordism in two ways: the process of deskilling and replacement of workers is 
accelerated through new technologies when the policy of cost reduction is 
also carried on by trying to evade the collective agreements. 
A large part of management believed that the non-homogeneity of 
American workers would rule out the forming of semi-autonomous teams 
(Parker and Slaughter, 1989) and that Japan's success could be ascribed to its 
investment in technology (Nora, 1988), for example, between 1981 and 1988, 
GM invested over $5 billion in new technologies (Huard, 1990). The 
automation has been tacked on to old production diagrams (Nora, 1988) so 
the result was a case of hybridation of assembly-line with computer control 
(Boyer, 1989). Furthermore, there was no up-grading of skills, competences or 
commitments of the workers. On the contrary, new technicians were called upon 
to operate computers, so the traditional workers' know-how was still more 
undervalued. This is what happened in the American aluminium industry where 
workers had no access to the new computers controlling the production 
process (Lapointe, 1991). 
At the same time, many forms of avoiding the collective rules were worked 
out. The "concessions bargaining" is well known: the COLA and AIF as 
wage rules were dropped; wage increases had the form of flat sums not 
integrated into the salary scale; share ownership programs were introduced 
(Katz and Meltz, 1988). These concessions, which had originated in the 
automobile industry in 1979, spread to a number of other industries, including 
steel, meat packing and some airlines (Katz, 1985). Wage concessions also 
took on the form of a polarization of the labor collective through the 
introduction of two-tiered agreements whereby new employees received a 
lower salary — between 15% and sometimes as much as 62% less — as in 
the airline industry in 1985, and for the same job (Campbell and Pépin, 
1988). At Ford and GM, in 1982, newly-hired
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employees received 85% of the regular salary and the waiting period to reach 
parity, which was 40 days, was prolonged to 545 days (Huard, 1990). 
Contracting out and relocation of plants in developing countries, including 
Mexico were also parts of that neo-fordist strategy (Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
In the case of the United States we can draw several conclusions. 
Indeed, it would seem that the main trend is towards dissolving or weakening 
collective rules, hence towards deregulating labor relations. This would 
indicate a form of neo- liberalism in which two models would co-exist (see 
Table 2): a.) n e o - F o r d i s m  based on both deskilling by means of new 
technologies, and polarization of the collective, which further calls for 
contracting out, and b.) an individualized Californian model, symbolized by 
the southern strategy. This second model is evidently the most significant not 
only in the small and medium-sized businesses which as a rule are non 
unionized (Messine, 1987), but also in larger companies where it reinforces 
the already widespread non-unionized model, putting the emphasis on labor 
reorganization through requalification and participation. 
CANADA 
In the case of Canada, except for Québec which we will examine in the 
following section, it would appear that modifications to Fordism are more 
difficult to bring about and that when they are occurring, they illustrate a 
trend towards neo-fordism. Here also the car industry is a good example of the 
main orientation of labor-management relations and work organization. 
In the car industry, there have been neither huge concessions nor successful 
de-unionization strategies nor major reforms of the organization of labor. 
Through a strike at Chrysler in 1982 and another in 1984 against  
GM, the Canadian Auto Workers
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(CAW) rejected ail the demands for concessions that their American 
counterparts had accepted. Wages continued to go up according to the classic 
COLA and AIF formulas, therefore surpassing those of the American workers 
(Campbell and Pépin, 1988; Huard, 1990). This divergence in bargaining 
strategies entailed, as we have already mentioned, a split between the 
international union and the creation of the CAW in 1984. There were, of 
course, wage concessions in some sectors. Also, a southern-style strategy is 
harder to apply in Canada since no province has adopted legislation in favour 
of the right to work and, in consequence, non-unionization. Moreover, the rate 
of unionization is much higher than in the United States: 36.2% as opposed to 
about 15% in 1989. It should also be noted that the rate of unionization is 
steadily increasing in Canada (it was only 28.4% in 1951), whereas in the 
United States, it has been steadily declining from its highest level of 31.7%, 
reached in 1955 (Coates et al., 1989). In any case, although present, the non-
unionized model is less generalized in Canada than in the United States. 
In the automotive industry, some attempts have been made to introduce 
QLW or quality circle programs. Strong worker opposition caused one such 
attempt to fail (Parker, 1986). In another case, participation groups were set up 
with the union's consent, but after two years, the plant committee curtailed its 
collaboration by withdrawing its representatives from the planning committee 
(Rinehart, 1984). Only one appears to have taken hold, GM-Suzuki, where the 
"Japanese model" had been negotiated with the union in 1985 (Campbell and 
Pépin, 1988) but this is an isolated case. In ail economy sectors, there have 
been much fewer initiatives of work reorganization in Canada than in the 
United States. According to a recent survey, there were proportionally half as 
many initiatives undertaken in Canada than in U.S. (Long,1991). 
Union opposition therefore blocks the way to the Californian as well to the 
renewed Fordist models. For employers, the only way out of Fordism would 
be to resort to contracting out and part-time
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work which would result in diluted collective standards; in a recent poll, 
these were the main objectives put forward by Canadian management for the 
next bargaining round (Kumar and Coates, 1989). There were indeed wages 
concessions in some sectors as well as two-tiered clauses, but they occurred 
with some delay (Wood, no date), which demonstrated stronger résistance on 
the part of the unions, and some new cases of subcontracting in order to 
reduce costs were noted (Drache et Glasbeek, 1990). 
If we venture to generalize these observations, the conclusion would 
be that then Fordist model appears to hold sway in Canada while the 
alternatives lean towards neo-Fordism. The difference from the U.S. can be 
explained by differences of the social forces. In Canada the rate of 
unionization is high and unions are powerful, well-organized and, especially, 
defensive; they consider every move from Fordism, even those regarding new 
forms of work organization as a threat to the future of unions (Drache and 
Glasbeek, 1990; Rinehart, 1986). On the other side, the uncertainty and splits 
among Canadian employers regarding human resource management strategies 
(Smith, 1990) hinder the implementation of new labor-management relations. 
QUÉBEC 
Does Québec form a distinct society in the area of labor relations? Labor-
management relations here are as diverse as anywhere else. There are 
companies to fit every model of Table 1. The public sector and corporations 
such as Hydro-Québec, for example, lean towards neo-Fordism (contracting 
out, part-time, polarization, etc.) and therefore towards a lessening of 
collective rules (Chanlat, 1984; Hafsi and Demers, 1989; Bélanger and 
Lévesque, 1987 and 1990). And many cases of renewed fordism could cited 
(Lapointe, 1991; Doré and Ferland, 1991). But relying on
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monographs available, our contention is that there is an emerging Québec style 
characterized by the co-existence of the Californian and plant democracy 
models. 
The GM plant in Boisbriand probably represents a model unprecedented in 
the North American auto industry and shares some of the elements of plant 
democracy. At the beginning of the 1980s, the plant was threatened with closure: 
on the productivity and quality scales of ail the GM plants in North America, 
Boisbriand was listed the last one; around 6000 to 7000 grievances were 
unsettled in 1984; the local agreement was the last one to be signed in 1984, so 
delaying the national (Canadian) negotiation; the plant lost the contract to 
assemble a new car, the GM-10. These are some indications of the adversarial 
fordist relations prevailing in that plant. A new manager was mandated from 
Détroit to try to redress the plant's problems and, if not successful, to close it. At 
the same time, new local union leaders had been elected to cope with the workers' 
exasperation giving rise to grievances. Both parties engaged in an in-depth 
process of reflection on labor-management relations and labor organization. 
During the process of negotiation, old grievances were settled and new ones went 
down to nearly zero; roughly 35% of management positions were abolished and 
the plant, with fairly obsolete technology, soared to first place in terms of 
performance (productivity and quality). And it recently succeeded in obtaining a 
ten-year contract highly coveted by a number of other plants, most of them in 
the United States. The agreement was concluded after two years of 
negotiations. Three innovations warrant special mention: the declaration of 
principles, the work teams and the joint committees (Huard, 1990). 
Both parties adopted a declaration of principles which is far from the traditional 
recognition of management rights. It states that the union's role is to improve the 
quality of working life, the job security and the environment where members are 
treated with dignity and respect;  
that the company's objectives are to secure its
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growth and build the best quality product; and that both parties have agreed on 
means to achieve their objectives. This declaration realizes the move from a 
defensive unionism of opposition to an offensive unionism of proposal. 
As for the organization of teamwork, this also differs from the one 
implemented in non-unionized firms or where the local union is in a weak 
position like at NUMMI. There cooperation is urged by management and 
encouraged via individual incentives (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986; see also 
Parker and Slaughter, 1988, and their description of work teams at NUMMI). At 
Boisbriand, it was an issue in a negotiation process and collective rules haven 
been established. For example, team leaders who relieve the foremen are 
members of the union and appointed by seniority; the pay for knowledge was 
turned down and wage increases are also subject to promotion rules according to 
seniority; absenteeism remains the responsibility of management and not of the 
work teams. Thus, while accepting the basic principles of working in teams 
(accountability, involvement in quality, improvement of production procedures, 
flexibility in the assignment of tasks through simplified classifications), the 
union refused to individualize wages and relations with management. It insisted on 
collective standards promoting the solidarity and unity of workers. 
This modus operandi of the teams is seconded by joint committees which, 
on the one hand, monitor the setting-up and operations of the teams, and on the 
other, ensure the teams have a say in activities and decisions which until then 
had been considered as prerogatives of the management, such as personnel 
transfers, new technologies, training programs, company performance, etc. As 
compared to Fordism, these joint committees represent an enlargement of the 
rights of the union and an inclusion in the policy-making mechanisms of the 
plant. Along with the declaration of principles and the reskilling of workers 
through teamwork organization, this increased participation can be considered 
as a trend towards plant democracy. 
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Quite similar cases could be described. A well documented analysis of the 
aluminums industry in Québec shows that some of the seven plants are heading 
for that model (Lapointe, 1991). Already the work organization has been changed: 
tasks are broadened to allow for versatility and rotation; operators have been 
trained to use the computers without technical management personnel, involvement 
in productivity and quality is recognized and in one plant promoted by job 
security. The mechanisms of participation are less explicitly developed but the local 
union is associated with many informal joint committees. 
The Californian model is also wide spread in Québec. The most 
representative firms of that trend are located outside large cities, controlled by new 
Québec francophone managers, some of these firms being considered as symbols 
of performance and success. The main features of these firms are a low degree of 
institutionalization of the relations between management and the workforce 
combined with a high degree of workers' involvement in the firm and trust in the 
management. 
The low institutionalization is obvious in one of these firms, Cascades 
Inc. In most of the about thirty plants, there is no union; yet there are yearly 
negotiations, but the meetings are quite informal and are concluded by the 
managers' decisions on what demands can be satisfied. Furthermore, some 
decisions remain implicit and rest upon custom or mutual confidence. There is no 
codification of the profit-sharing program nor a formal provision about job 
security, but every worker is feels secure that there will be no layoffs and that a 
fair bonus will be distributed (Cuggia, 1989; Aktouf, 1990). 
In these firms, the work organization is less than rigid. There are no detailed job 
definitions, the workteams are the central pieces of the labor process and their 
responsability and autonomy is acknowledged by thé absence of foremen. The 
coordination does not follow a strict hierarchical line: there are few levels of 
authority, more mutual understandings than orders;
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communications are addressed at the level or the service concerned; formal 
rules are minimal. The main mechanism of coordination is "cultural": 
confidence, mutual respect, trust, sense of belonging, responsability, 
participation, commitment are the key symbols of that form of organization 
and are always reinforced by charismatic leaders. 
The trend in Québec leads to the cooperative models, either 
management-leaded (californian) or negotiated (plant democracy). The first 
one, as far as it is located in small communities or regional areas, can be 
understood as a feature of regional identity where relations are both cooperative 
and competitive. Mutual help binds people together on the same issues, and 
worker-management relations are less adversorial because of mobility, kinship 
and closeness (Billette and Carrier, 1991). These features give rise to local 
institutions as regulatory mechanisms and to less institutionalized more 
paternalistic and charismatic relations in the workplace. The second one has to 
be referred at least partly to specified labor-management relations. The union 
density is high at 40 percent (Grant and Lebeau, 1991); the unionism is less 
"international" (American) and more Québec grounded; above ail, it is less 
defensive and more open to work reorganization (Doré and Ferland, 1991) and 
concerted policy with management (Fournier, 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
One of the conclusions that can be drawn from our first investigation is 
the diversity of national trends in North America. These remain to be clearly 
defined; in every country, we may find firms that fall under one or the other of 
the models identified. However, in every country, we noted trends forming 
around not one model but at least two (see Table 2). 
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In the U.S., as we have noted, the union density is relatively low (15 
percent) and, moreover, it has been decreasing since the 1950s as if the earlier 
movement was being systematically attacked by employers. It is well 
documented that American employers are fiercely attached to their 
prerogatives and management's rights (Perline and Poynter, 1991), even more 
than Canadian employers (Kochan, 1986). The political coalition favourable to 
trade unions lost more and more ground (Heckscher, 1988) and right-to-work 
legislation in some southern states 
Table 2 H  odels of Firms: Canada, Québec, U.S.A.. 
Collective rules 
and 
exclusion 
Dissolution or 
veakening of 
collective rules 
Collective rules 
with inclusion-
participation   
(2) Neo-Fordism 
C-A-N-A-
D-A 
(4) Reneved 
Fordism 
  
 (1) 
Fordism 
(3) 
Social democratie 
Taylorism 
Deskïlling 
(5) 
CiJifo (6) Plant 
democracy Reskilling 
Organizational 
and 
technological 
changes 
Q-U-E-B-E-C
— fluctuation of national models 
 21
 
encouraged de-unionization. Whereas in the 1960s, unions had been able to 
impose and generalize the advantages they negotiated, today, the non-
unionized model (southern strategy) serves as an example to firms as a 
whole. Perhaps we can conclude that centralized unions accustomed to 
settling ail manner of demands on a monetary level reacted belatedly to the 
labor crisis and to the new, more qualitative demands of the workers. 
During the wave of concessions, unions as powerful as the UAW were 
unable to come up with compensations or new issues with then result that, 
in many cases, neo-Fordism took root. Besides the labor-management 
relations, some other institutional factors have prevented the renewal of 
work organization and of the very strategies of unions and management. For 
examples, as Boyer noted, "the strength of financial short run objectives 
hinders the boldness of strategies choice of industrial renaissance and 
implementation of a new capital labor relation. (And) the poor performance 
of the education System does not help in engineering an upgrading of skills, 
competences and commitments" (Boyer, 1989). 
 
In Canada, the high level of union density (36%), a less bureaucratic activism, 
a defensive orientation and the endorsement of a social democratic political 
party (NDP) placed the unions in a better position than the American ones 
to uphold acquired gains and resist the anti-union movement. On the other 
hand, the national Canadian bourgeoisie is quite divided by the presence of 
powerful foreign industrial capital beside weak indigenous industrialists 
and strong indigenous financiers (Panitch, 1985). This division prevents the 
development of a national strategy of industrialization and helps to explain 
the weight of regional interests in the policy-making process (Jenson, 
1990). A strong and defensive unionism tried to block the exits from 
Fordism while the splits in management resulted in hesitant and few 
initiatives regarding new models of firms (Long, 1991; Smith, 1990). For the 
uncompetitive firms, the only available strategy was to reduce
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costs   by   segmentation   or   new   technologies,   that   is   via   n e o -
fordism. 
The Québec pattern seems to be different from both U.S. and 
Canada. The presence of a Californian model, as elsewhere, is not a new 
phenomenon. But it has received these last years a new impulse from 
dynamic francophone management who rely on communion and informal 
relations to face the challenge of the international environment. Some of these 
leaders use in their own interest, that is preventing unionization, some of the 
principles of the new emerging compromise between unions and management 
which resulted in the plant democracy model. This conflicting cooperation 
model singles out Québec from both the U.S. and the rest of Canada and can 
be accounted for by the institutional setting. First the large collective effort of 
modernization since the 1960s has resulted in a network of state, cooperative 
and private corporations-Québec Inc.- which is unique in North America 
(Fraser, 1987) and induces to societal responsibility. Second, many union-
management-state joint boards (like health and safety at work) and 
consultative forums (like "Sommets économiques" and "Forum sur l'emploi") 
have paved the way for alliances in formulating major national strategies 
either in economy development projects or in vocational training, for example. 
Third, unions have made pledges to the renewal of labor-management 
relations and the management of firms for a more democratic participation; the 
CNTU (Confédération of National Trade Unions) emphazises work 
reorganization while the QFL (Québec Fédération of Labor) stresses full 
employment and has set up a Workers' Solidarity Fund devoted to investing 
risk capital to save jobs and to support workers' commitment in these firms. 
These different trends in North America deserve greater study indeed. Most 
of the time, explanations regarding both the differences between Canada and 
U.S. (Lipset, 1986) and between Canada and Québec (Aktouf,1990; Chanlat, 
1990) refer to cultural, even religious, dimensions.  
Our objective here is just to suggest
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some clues that focus on the institutional (Aglietta, 1976) or societal 
(Maurice, 1989) setting. But given that the institutions are rooted in social 
classes and social movements (Lipietz, 1989; Touraine, 1978), we have to 
admit that research remains to be done since the land is unexplored. 
Lastly, from a North American standpoint, it must be acknowledged 
that, even more than elsewhere, the problem of reskilling and work 
reorganization is of the highest importance. Most of the comparative studies 
conclude that, at least partly, the relative success of Germany and Japan, for 
example, relies on flexible organization and vocational training (Coriat, 1990; 
Streeck, 1989). Indeed diversity and quality of products cannot be dealt with 
by purely taylorist methods of production. They require enlarged 
competences, commitment and responsibility. Furthermore, these 
requirements match pressing workers' demands for initiative and autonomy. 
These new features lead to decentralization, teamwork and increased 
communications among workers and with other levels and sectors in the 
firm. In order to cope with fast changes and larger integration between manual 
and intellectual components of any work, not only can workers1 know-how 
not be denied any longer, but they will also need more training and educational 
background. 
This new situation raises the problem of integration or coordination within the 
firm. If the firm, to meet today's challenges, has to support workers' autonomy 
and grant thé means to encourage it, how are authority and power to be 
maintained? Cannot this autonomy become the source of more disputes and 
conflict? This autonomy can be turned to a strong identification to the firm's 
objectives through personal leadership and "corporate culture" (Messine, 
1987). This can lead to new forms of domination through symbolic 
manipulation of motives and interests. Workers' conditions then lie with 
management's goodwill: they will deteriorate if  
short-term objectives prevail and managers relie on
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money exchange rates, interest rates or wage decreases to face the 
competitive environment. 
But since autonomy and commitment are required by modem 
management, they can be "offered" by unions in exchange of good wages 
and improved working conditions as well as some inclusion in the policy-
making process. This institutional arrangement presents two main 
advantages. First, the managers are forced to innovate and launch new and 
high value-added products in order to survive (Boyer, 1989). And 
second, participation via democratic mechanisms strengthens workers' 
involvement and enlarges their knowledge of the firm's management and 
needs, though it requires common objectives and less symbolic manipulation. 
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